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Summary: The jurisprudence of the ECJ and national constitutional 
courts related to the national constitutional identities of the Members 
States fi ts into the framework of constitutional pluralism as a modus 
vivendi of the European legal order. This paper focuses in particular 
on the recent judgments of the Polish and Czech constitutional courts. 
One might perceive a general tendency in the process of EU integra-
tion for EU policies to be increasingly dominated by national agen-
das. As a result, EU policies might be held hostage by the interests of 
the stronger Member States. These tendencies increase the tensions 
inherent in the pluralist structure of the relationships between legal 
orders in the European arena. Constitutional identity is yet another 
concept used in this debate about ultimate authority. Pluralism as-
sumes that the courts will compete over ultimate authority and will try 
to use such a concept ‘to their advantage’. With regard to article 4 (2) 
TEU, the ECJ seems to have more persuasive power than the Polish 
and the Czech constitutional courts. However, the jurisprudence is 
certainly not settled yet.
The interweaving of national, European and international law creates 
the need to examine constitutional identity expressed inside and out-
side the EU. Pure heterarchy based on a balance of powers and pro-
tection of national constitutions as well as constitutional courts comes 
with the inherent risk of leading to the logic of ‘might is right’. On the 
other hand, even though one could identify cases where the judicial 
actors seem to miss an opportunity to improve the protection of indi-
vidual rights or where they reveal a troubling eagerness to ensure 
their own authority, such risks are an idiosyncrasy of the system of 
constitutional pluralism. The theory of constitutional pluralism has the 
ambition of improving the quality of judgments and creating a frame-
work for fruitful interaction of competing visions of Europe. Single 
judgments that may be open to criticism do not bring into question the 
viability of the whole framework, but it is nonetheless important to be 
aware of the systemic risks.
* Erasmus Mundus Fellow - GEM PhD School, PhD candidate at Institut d’Etudes Eu-
ropéennes - Université Libre de Bruxelles (IEE-ULB) and Institut Européen - Université de 
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I. Introduction 
The issues of enlargement of the European Union (EU), the euro 
crisis, national and European identity as well as the debate on the rela-
tions between legal orders in the international arena all come together 
on the Kirchberg Plateau, at the seat of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Mainly due to an increase in the caseload, a legislative proposal 
for a reform of the Statute of the ECJ has been introduced and is cur-
rently awaiting its fi rst reading in the European Parliament.1 This reform 
would involve changes in the procedure and the composition affecting all 
three ‘instances’ of the institution. In particular, the decision to increase 
the number of judges at the General Court, instead of creating another 
specialised tribunal, shows that certain considerations were crucial for 
the judges, namely the guarantee of the coherence of the jurisprudence 
and the constitutional role of the Court of Justice. However, these pro-
cedural changes that might be seen to lie on the surface run in parallel 
with the constantly evolving structural position and role of the ECJ in 
the process of European integration. Both procedural and jurispruden-
tial ‘modernisation’ represents efforts to strengthen the institution. Even 
though the fi rst one has been subject to heated debate on the need to 
guarantee the coherence of the jurisprudence, as well as the effi cient 
functioning of the EU courts, the developments in the latter stream ap-
pear to be more controversial as their effects on the constitutional role of 
the ECJ are ambivalent.
The jurisprudential changes have to be identifi ed through an analy-
sis of the Court’s jurisprudence. In this paper, I focus on the concept of 
constitutional identity, as this demonstrates the crucial tension in the 
European framework. The process of European integration oscillates be-
tween the ‘supranational tendency’, which in the legal context involves 
strengthening the position of the ECJ, and the ‘intergovernmental ten-
dency’, which strengthens the position of national constitutional courts. 
The same kind of tension has resurfaced during the euro crisis, and 
the adopted solution in the form of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) signed on 
2 March 2012 is rather intergovernmental.2 In fact, the Member States 
chose a ‘traditional’ form of international negotiation that naturally 
strengthens the role of the richer, bigger or more powerful partners. At 
1  Court of Justice of the European Union, Legislative proposal 2011/0901(COD) of 
28 March 2011, summary <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.
do?id=1148372&t=e&l=en> accessed 7 June 2012.
2  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG), signed on 2 March 2012 <http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/
st00tscg26_en12.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012.
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the national level, a legal mechanism that is supposed to guarantee re-
spect of the less privileged parties in a community has been the consti-
tutional model. In the European pluralist structure, the question arises 
of who the guardian of the national constitutional identity of the Member 
States is: the ECJ or the national constitutional courts? 
These procedural and jurisprudential developments have to be an-
alysed against the background of theoretical debates on the relations 
between legal orders in the international arena. These include the na-
tional, European and international levels, which are nowadays tightly 
interwoven.3 Hence the need to examine European identity expressed to 
the inside and outside of the EU. This paper analyses the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, as well as the national constitutional courts’ use of the con-
cept of national constitutional identity in light of constitutional plural-
ism within the EU. Possible consequences of the recent developments 
and tensions within the EU on account of its actions at the international 
level are also highlighted. The fundaments for the construction of a Eu-
ropean identity have been identifi ed mainly in the external relations of 
the EU. While consolidation of the jurisdiction of the ECJ can contrib-
ute to strengthening its position on the internal plan of the EU, striv-
ing to ensure the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction on all issues concerning 
European law might undermine its position on the international scene. 
Similarly, while developing national constitutional identity as a concept 
of European law might enlarge the scope of jurisprudence of the ECJ and 
ensure its fl exibility, from an external perspective this could diminish 
the transparency and legal security of the EU as an international actor.
Before moving to substantive considerations, it is important to brief-
ly clarify the use of certain terms and notions in this paper. According to 
article 19 TEU, the Court of Justice of the EU, commonly referred to as 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), includes the Court of Justice, the 
General Court (GC) and specialised courts (currently only the Civil Serv-
ice Tribunal (CST)). These can be referred to as EU courts. Following the 
general logic of EU legislation, I will also use the terms ‘EU law’ and ‘Eu-
ropean law’ interchangeably. For national constitutional courts, in or-
der to facilitate the distinction between the jurisdictions, I will use their 
names in the native languages. Obviously, within the constraints of this 
paper, I cannot conduct a complete analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
constitutional courts of the Member States. Moreover, such studies have 
already been already carried out.4 Therefore, I will often use the German 
3  Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 
2010) 8.
4  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph Weiler (eds), The European Court 
and National Courts (Hart Publishing 1998); José Maria Beneyto, Ingolf Pernice, Europe’s 
Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional 
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Federal Constitutional Court - the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 
- as a reference point as it has probably been the most outspoken on the 
question of the relationship between national and European law.5 
The changing constitutional role of the ECJ has already been de-
scribed from a historical perspective.6 In this paper, I focus on very re-
cent developments and present how the concepts of European and na-
tional constitutional identities have been articulated by the ECJ and by 
the national constitutional courts. European and national constitutional 
identities in the context of the constitutional role of the ECJ and the na-
tional constitutional courts are ultimately two sides of the same coin. 
I approach the topic in four steps. First, I briefl y present the notion 
of national constitutional identity and its relation to a common Euro-
pean identity. Secondly, I present the debate on ultimate jurisprudential 
authority in the European framework. Jurisprudence has proven that 
the domain of human rights is the most fertile ground for potential con-
fl icts between legal orders as human rights norms are often perceived as 
constituting the core values of a legal order.7 Therefore, the main actors 
or competitors in this debate are the national constitutional courts, the 
ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Even before the 
Lisbon Treaty there were many episodes in this jurisprudential debate. 
They drew the attention of academia and those engaged in politics and 
generally involved all partners in judicial dialogue. Thirdly, I explain 
how constitutional identity can be perceived as a concept helping to con-
struct European constitutionalism. Finally, I focus on the articulation 
of the most recent normative addition to identity: article 4 (2) TEU in 
the jurisprudence of European courts. The notion of national constitu-
tional identity has resurfaced in the jurisprudence of both the ECJ and 
the national constitutional courts. The Court in Luxembourg has used 
it to grant Member States free passage to keep their particular legisla-
tion, restricting certain rights or freedoms under EU law. Yet, by doing 
so, the ECJ has put itself in the position of gatekeeper of the national 
constitutional identity of the Member States, perceiving it as a concept of 
EU law. The ECJ has simply continued with its previous jurisprudence, 
Courts (Nomos Publishers 2011); Matthias Wendel, ‘Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative 
Perspective’ (2011) 7(1) European Constitutional Law Review 96.
5  See Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1103, 1107; Frank Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as an Association 
of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal 1219, 1232.
6  Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Changing Constitutional Role of the European Court of Justice’ 
(Summer 2006) 34(2) International Journal of Legal Information 222.
7  See JHH Weiler, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography and 
Fetishism’ (2001) 3 International Law FORUM du droit international 227, 228-229.
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adding one new concept to its palette. In order to show how this attitude 
can contradict the national perspective, I discuss two recent and con-
troversial judgments of the Polish Constitutional Court - Trybunał Kon-
stytucyjny (TK) and the Czech Constitutional Court - Ústavní soud (ÚS), 
which review the constitutionality of an EU regulation and the limits of 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. This analysis of jurisprudence clearly re-
veals that there is a link between national identity and sovereignty.8
II. National and European identity as two sides of the same coin 
The notion of European identity has been present in the norma-
tive framework of the EU for a long time. In 1973, the Heads of State or 
Government of the European Communities, meeting at the Copenhagen 
European Summit, signed a Declaration on European Identity, stating 
that the Member States:
 (…) wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, politi-
cal and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety 
of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to 
life, based on a determination to build a society which measures 
up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the 
principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social 
justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of 
respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of 
the European Identity.9 
Since then it has proven diffi cult to affi rm more elements of the 
common European identity.10 Naturally, instead of making a clear posi-
tive choice it is easier to assert a standpoint by negatively positioning 
oneself vis-à-vis others. Hence, it has been easier to affi rm the European 
identity to the outside than to the inside. The only express reference in 
the Treaties to European identity can be found in the context of external 
action.11 The Treaties do, however, contain references to EU values as 
8  Franz C Mayer, ‘Rashomon in Karlsruhe - A Refl ection on Democracy and Identity in the 
European Union: The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Decision and the Changing 
Landscape of European Constitutionalism’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 757, 783.
9  Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973) EC Bulletin 1973 No 
12, 2 <http://www.cvce.eu/obj/Declaration_on_European_Identity_Copenhagen_14_De-
cember_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html> accessed 7 June 2012.
10  For example the ‘failed’ Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310/1 
and the question of a reference to Christianity in the preamble of this Constitution. See 
Srdjan Cvijic and Lorenzo Zucca, ‘Does the European Constitution Need Christian Values?’ 
(2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 739. 
11  Eleventh recital to the preamble of TEU: ‘RESOLVED to implement a common foreign 
and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which 
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guiding principles for the exercise of both internal and external powers.12 
Even though the ECJ has never made an express reference to ‘European 
identity’, it has emphasised the importance of the EU’s values and stand-
ards when dealing with legal provisions external to the EU legal order.13 
At the same time, the ECJ has been referring both expressly as well as 
implicitly to the national identities of the Member States. The role of the 
ECJ as the ultimate umpire in the EU has constantly been challenged. 
The national constitutional courts perceive themselves as the sole gate-
keepers of national constitutional identities that constitute the untouch-
able core of the national legal orders. As a consequence of this multi-level 
judicial dialogue, the concept of European constitutional identity is at 
least as complex from the internal perspective (inside the EU) as from the 
external one (outside the EU). This is refl ected in the normative provisions 
of the Treaties. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the emphasis has shifted to 
the national constitutional identities of the Member States. Article 6 (3) 
TEU stipulated that ‘the Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States’. As a consequence of the amendments introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty, article 4 (2) TEU reads as follows: ‘the Union shall respect 
the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their na-
tional identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’.
According to the documents of the responsible Working Group of the 
European Convention, the purpose of this reform was ‘to provide added 
transparency of what constitutes essential elements of national identity, 
which the EU must respect in the exercise of its competence’.14 However, 
the mere expansion of the concept of national identity in the Treaties 
has caused quite a stir. It has provoked reactions and speculations both 
in academic and public discourse.15 One might claim that the legislative 
amendment has at least signifi cant declaratory power as it refl ects the 
general tendency in the approach of the Member States to the process 
might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 42, thereby 
reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security 
and progress in Europe and in the world’ (emphasis added).
12  Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU.
13  Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Inter-
national Foundation v Council of the EU and Commission of the EC [2008] ECR I-06351(here-
inafter Kadi), paras 282, 290, 304.
14  Final report of Working Group V of the European Convention, 4 November 2002, 10 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00375-re01.en02.pdf > accessed 
7 June 2012.
15  See inter alia Sinisa Rodin, ‘National Identity and Market Freedoms after The Treaty 
of Lisbon’ (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005691> accessed 7 June 2012; ‘European 
Values and Identity’ EurActiv (9 May 2006) <http://www.euractiv.com/culture/european-
values-identity-linksdossier-188378?display=normal> accessed 7 June 2012.
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of European integration, which underlines its constraints. In the euro 
crisis, the Member States chose to abandon the ‘community method’ 
as a way to introduce the necessary measures, but instead decided to 
sign a separate international treaty that is now expected to be ratifi ed 
by 25 Member States.16 In the history of the EU, we can fi nd examples 
of treaties like Schengen or Prüm that were fi rst signed as international 
treaties, later to be integrated into the framework of the EU.17 Nonethe-
less, this solution might be viewed as one disregarding the institutional 
structure of the EU, undermining the democratic legitimacy of the Union 
and even representing a triumph of national egoisms. On the other hand, 
the new wording of article 4 (2) TEU might just be another representation 
of a phenomenon that is already familiar to EU law. The ECJ has already 
been accepting national constitutional particularities as a justifi cation 
for Treaty derogation.18 Then it would be yet another example of putting 
into normative provisions principles that have already been recognised 
and applied by the Court, just as was the case with the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. 
Further, it is interesting to observe how the current debate on the 
national identities of the Member States affects the still open question 
of construing a common constitutional identity of the EU. The argument 
that the EU is too diverse for a common constitutional identity has re-
surfaced at various stages of European integration. It has been pointed 
out that the EU lacks both a common ethnos as well as a demos.19 At 
fi rst glance, the constitutional diversity within the EU might seem di-
rectly proportional to the number of Member States. However, this is not 
the crucial factor. Even though EU enlargements have resulted in larger 
numbers of partners to include in a consensus, constitutional diversity 
has in fact always been inherent in the structure of the EU. For instance, 
there were three opt-outs from the Charter of Fundamental Rights - two 
by the ‘new Member States’ Poland and the Czech Republic, but also by 
the UK. The same opt-outs can be viewed either as putting a spoke in the 
wheel of European integration in order to preserve national identity and 
16  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (TSCG), signed 2 March 2012 <http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/
st00tscg26_en12.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012.
17  The Schengen Acquis [2000] OJ L239/1 was integrated with the Treaty of Am-
sterdam [1997] OJ C340/1; the Prüm Convention <http://register.consilium.europa.
eu/pdf/en/05/st10/st10900.en05.pdf > accessed 7 June 2012 was partly trans-
posed in 2007. See <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/
803&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr> accessed 7 June 2012.
18  For example Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609.
19  Michel Rosenfeld, ‘The European Treaty - Constitution and Constitutional Identity. A 
Comment on Professor von Bogdandy’ (2004) Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, 11.
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sovereignty, or as proof of the solidity of the European construction. The 
latter perspective would invoke the argument that those opt-outs are in 
fact void, as the provisions of the Charter are already enshrined in the 
general principles of EU law as they have been developed by the ECJ, 
which proves the stability of the European legal order.20 
European and national constitutional identities are ambivalent 
terms with unclear contours. From the perspective of political philoso-
phy, common European identity or at least constitutional patriotism can 
be regarded as a basis for a democratic link between citizens and the 
government.21 However, ‘the notion of “national identity” has over time 
acquired a legally more relevant fl avour by its reformulation as “consti-
tutional identity”’.22 This paper focuses on European and national con-
stitutional identities as legal concepts. Constitutional identity is not an 
individual but rather a collective identity of the national constitution.23 
At the same time, national constitutional identity is diverse as it is en-
compasses the essential particularities of each constitutional order.24
The identity question in its internal and external dimensions is par-
ticularly intertwined in the context of the EU, as the EU domesticates 
relations between states. It touches upon one of the crucial characteris-
tics of European integration, namely that the EU tries to bring a sense 
of common responsibility to international relations among its Member 
States and then also promotes this method in its external relations.25 
This will be achieved ‘by each Member State’s acceptance of the unique 
identity of the other Member States within a framework of law, based not 
on strict hierarchy, but on diversity and loyalty’.26 Hence, for the purpose 
of analysing the tools in the pluralist structure of European and inter-
national law, the national and European constitutional identities can be 
treated as two sides of the same coin. 
20  Mayer (n 8) 784.
21 See inter alia: Patrizia Nanz, Europolis: Constitutional Patriotism Beyond the Nation-State 
(Manchester University Press 2006); Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Verfassungspatriotismus: Eine 
systematische Verteidigung’ (2010) 3 Zeitschrift für Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik 
111.
22  Leonard FM Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon’ 
(2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 36, 37.
23  Mayer (n 8) 783.
24  Alexandre Viala, ‘Le concept d’identité constitutionnelle: approche théorique’ in Lau-
rence Burgorgue-Larsen (ed), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe (Edi-
tions Pedone 2011) 9.
25  Geert De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP 2008) 314.
26  De Baere (n 25).
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III. Disputed ultimate authority 
The pluralist structure of relations between European and national 
law of the Member States involves constant competition for ultimate au-
thority.27 Apparently, a crucial means to ensure the uniform application 
of EU law is the Court of Justice as the instance to review the jurispru-
dence of the other EU courts and to answer the preliminary ruling ques-
tions from the national courts. In order to be able to fully fulfi l this role, 
the Court of Justice would need to have ultimate authority to decide on 
the application and interpretation of EU provisions, even if they override 
national constitutional provisions. However, such consolidation of judi-
cial power and responsibility does not seem to be a view shared by all 
judicial actors on the European stage. The question of potential confl icts 
becomes a particularly sensitive issue in the domain of human rights, as 
understanding of this is often viewed as a part of national constitutional 
identity.
The European human rights regime can serve as an illustration of 
pluralist judicial dialogue.28 The main actors involved in guaranteeing 
protection of human rights in Europe are the national constitutional 
courts, the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
There is no hierarchically ordered system of human rights protection to 
clearly indicate the ultimate supremacy of the legal norms of the national 
constitutions, the general principles of EU law or the ECHR.29 In prin-
ciple, each of these three judicial actors asserts its ultimate authority.30 
The German Federal Constitutional Court can serve as an example for 
such an approach. In its Görgülü judgment, it asserted that the ECHR 
has the same rank as a regular federal statute.31 As long as the legisla-
tion leaves room for manoeuvre, the German courts are obliged to follow 
an interpretation that is in compliance with the ECHR.32 However, the 
limit of that principle is reached when, for instance due to a change in 
the factual situation, compliance with a judgment of the ECtHR would 
contradict the German statute or Constitution, namely the fundamental 
rights of third parties.33 
27  Nico Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2007) LSE Work-
ing Paper 11/2007, 3
28  Krisch (n 27) 33
29  Krisch (n 27).
30  Krisch (n 27) 15.
31  Görgülü [2004] BverfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 (14 October 2004), para 31.
32  Görgülü (n 31), para 62.
33  Görgülü (n 31).
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This is a very similar tone to the one adopted by the German Con-
stitutional Court with respect to EU law.34 It started sceptical to the 
Solange I35 judgment, but then practically reversed it in Solange II with 
the following statement:
As long as the European Communities, in particular European Court 
case law, generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights 
as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be 
regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental 
rights required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far 
as they generally safe-guard the essential content of fundamental 
rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community 
legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or 
authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the 
standard of the fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law.36
In the Maastricht decision, the Federal Constitutional Court under-
lined its relationship of cooperation with the ECJ and the fact that it 
would only become active again should the Court depart from the estab-
lished standard of fundamental rights.37
There are apparent parallels with the relationship established be-
tween the ECJ and the ECtHR by the Bosphorus judgment that was 
founded on the assumption of ‘equivalent protection’.38 However, this dia-
logue also had a rough start. In the Matthews judgments, the ECJ and 
the ECtHR reached different results.39 In the judgment of the ECtHR, 
the violation of the Convention is based on primary EC law, over which 
the Court of Justice had in principle no jurisdiction and which was con-
cluded by Member States by means of international treaties. Hence, the 
34 A series of judgments by the German Constitutional Court concerning the relationship 
with EU law: Solange I [1974] BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71; Vielleicht-Beschluβ [1979] 
BVerfGE 52,187, 2 BvL 6/77; Mittlerweile-Beschluβ [1983] 2 BvR 1461/82; Solange II [1986] 
BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83; Maastricht-Urteil [1993] BVerfGE 89, 155; Bananenmark-
tordnung-Urteil [2000] BVerfGE 102, 147; Lissabon-Urteil [2009] BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 (30 
June 2009) <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> 
accessed 1 July 2011
35  Solange I (n 34).
36 Solange II (n 34) headnotes point 2.
37 Maastricht-Urteil (n 34), para 174.
38  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland [GC] App no 45036/98 ECHR 2005-VI <http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Bosp
horus%20|%20Hava%20|%20Yollari%20|%20Turizm%20|%20v%20|%20Ireland&sessio
nid=3666597&skin=hudoc-en> accessed 1 July 2011.
39  Matthews v United Kingdom App no 24833/94 ECHR 1999-I; Case C-145/04 Kingdom 
of Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-07917.
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court could have traced the responsibility back to the Member State in 
question.40 However, since then the logic has rather been one of ‘division 
of labour’ along the lines of the fi eld of application of the respective legal 
orders.41 The Court in Strasbourg has thus declared numerous cases 
concerning EU measures inadmissible.42 Similarly, the ECJ was glad 
to avoid questions of fundamental rights by pointing to another place 
in cases that could be solved through other means of interpretation of 
EU legislation.43 In the case Centro Europa 7, the ECJ decided that the 
Italian national legislation that made it impossible for Centro Europa 7 
to broadcast due to the absence of broadcasting radio frequencies, al-
though it has been granted the rights for terrestrial television and radio 
broadcasting, was precluded by European law.44 The Court in Luxem-
bourg based its decision on article 49 EC and the relevant secondary 
legislation, instead of resorting to fundamental rights arguments raised 
by the referring court, in particular a possible breach of article 10 ECHR 
requiring Member States to secure pluralism and competition in the 
broadcasting sector. A breach of article10 ECHR was declared later in 
separate proceedings by the Court in Strasbourg, which also took into 
account the proceedings before the ECJ.45
Apart from the jurisprudential dialogue, there are also regular 
meetings between the judges from Luxembourg and Strasbourg that 
contribute to convergence and harmony in the relationship between the 
two courts.46 In view of the coming accession of the EU to the ECHR, the 
two courts are determined to engage in constructive dialogue to ensure 
‘quality and coherence of the case-law on the protection of fundamental 
40  Matthews (n 39), para 32.
41  Olivier De Schutter, ‘L’infl uence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur la Cour 
de justice des Communautés européennes’ (2005) CRIDHO Working Paper 2005/07, 3. 
42  See, for example, Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia v Germany and others App nos 6422/02 
and 9916/02 ECHR 2002-V; Senator Lines GmbH v the 15 Member States of the European 
Union App no 56672/00 ECHR 2004-IV; Connolly v the 15 Member States of the European 
Union App no 73274/01 (ECtHR 9 December 2008).
43  Daniel Sarmiento, ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing 
2012) 295.
44  Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni [2008] ECR I-
00349.
45  Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy [GC] App no 38433/09 (ECHR, 7 June 2012).
46 Example of the meetings: Dialogue between judges: ‘Fifty Years of the European Court of 
Human Rights Viewed by its Fellow International Courts’ Strasbourg 2009 <http://www.
echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B35F6B38-C429-48D2-AB33-77A3C0CD9DA3/0/Dialogue_
between_judges_2009.pdf> accessed 1 July 2011; Affi rming the harmony of the relationship 
between CJEU and ECtHR: Krisch (n 27) 19; Olivier De Schutter, ‘L’infl uence de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme sur la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes’ 
(2005) CRIDHO Working Paper 2005/07, 3. 
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rights in Europe’.47 On the other hand, the accession will raise new ques-
tions concerning the delimitation of the competences of the ECJ and the 
ECtHR in the co-respondent mechanism and in inter-party cases.48 
The cooperation between the ECJ and the ECtHR illustrates how lit-
tle importance can be attached to the formal setting of the legal orders. 
The Court in Strasbourg has developed its jurisprudence gradually in or-
der to keep the costs low for the Member States.49 In summary, it started 
with the ‘lowest common denominator’ and slowly raised the threshold 
for the standard of human rights protection by using an evolutionary ap-
proach to the convention as a ‘living instrument’.50 This might be regarded 
as necessary in view of the inherent need for the ECtHR to establish its 
authority through acceptance of its jurisprudence by the Member States of 
the Council of Europe.51 However, the ECJ has a stronger enforcement ap-
paratus at its disposal and far less concerns about the implantation of the 
judgments. In spite of this different formal setting within the respective 
legal order, the courts have adopted an approach based on mutual accom-
modation and judicial dialogue. It is not a one-way street, but a mutual 
process of accommodation that can be infl uenced not only by the judicial 
counterparts, but also by political actors or polity changes.52 
Undoubtedly there are divergences in the perception of the interac-
tions between the legal orders among the national constitutional courts, 
the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. These divergences might be fundamental in nature, but they 
do not seem to be visible on the surface. The reality of the judicial dia-
logue between the courts in Europe proves to be rather harmonious.53 
Due to these divergent perceptions, the relations among the Euro-
pean courts are in fact not hierarchical. They are self-contained jurisdic-
tions that are not bound by their own precedents and then a fortiori not 
by those of other judicial bodies.54 Even the relationship between the na-
47 Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris 24 January 2011, 3 <http://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf > ac-
cessed 1 July 2011.
48  Arts 3 and 4 of the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms CDDH-UE (2011) 
16 fi nal <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/cddh-ue/CDDH-UE_docu-
ments/CDDH-UE_2011_16_fi nal_en.pdf > accessed 7 June 2012.
49  Krisch (n 27) 28.
50  Krisch (n 27).
51  Krisch (n 27) 20.
52  Krisch (n 27) 27.
53  Krisch (n 27)15.
54  Daniel Terris, Cesare PR Romane and Leigh Swigart, The International Judge: An Intro-
duction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (BUP 2007) 120.
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tional constitutional courts and the ECJ within the supranational pillar 
is a lot more complex and nuanced than clear primacy.55 As a result, the 
political weight and public legitimacy of the actors involved can infl uence 
the direction of the legal development in a particular domain.56 It is the 
lack of established hierarchy that provides the basis for openness and 
responsiveness in the judicial dialogue. 
It is the pluralist vision that allows the current reality within the 
EU to be assessed. It provides the tools for explaining the apparent con-
tradiction between, on the one hand, the principled assertion of ultimate 
jurisdiction by both the national constitutional courts and the ECJ, and, 
on the other hand, the overall smoothly running cooperation in prac-
tice, which leads to growing convergence between the European jurisdic-
tions. 
IV. National constitutional identity: a concept of European law or a 
chance to strengthen the subsidiarity principle? 
In spite of some contradictions between the approaches of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg to 
the supremacy question in the domain of human rights, major confl icts 
have not arisen in the courts’ practice since the Solange II judgment.57 
In terms of the pluralistic vision of relations between national and Euro-
pean legal orders, that is as good as it gets - the question is settled not as 
a matter of hierarchy between legal norms, but rather by means of judi-
cial politics. However, such a solution has little promise with respect to 
stability. In particular, since the amendments introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, the concept of national constitutional identity gives new wind to 
the controversial debate on the challenged supremacy of EU law. This 
alone proves the importance of this concept in the European context.
In principle, ‘the concept may even help to pursue the aim of a mul-
tilevel polity’.58 Constitutional identity could be viewed as a concept of 
European law and hence another stage in the construction of European 
constitutionalism. A noteworthy attempt to grasp European constitu-
tionalism is provided by the vision of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ in-
troduced by Ingolf Pernice. It focuses on ‘the correlation of national and 
European law from the perspective of both states and citizens’.59 It views 
55  For example Solange I (n 34); Solange II (n 34).
56  Krisch (n 27) 33.
57 Solange II (n 34).
58  Mayer (n 8) 784.
59  Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 
Columbia Journal of European Law 349, 372.
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both the national and European levels of government operating as ele-
ments of one system whose purpose is to serve the same citizens. This 
vision involves an assumption that can be traced back to Rousseau’s 
social contract, namely that the citizens are the constituent, the origin 
of public authority.60
Two aspects of multilevel constitutionalism seem to be particularly 
attractive. The fi rst is its postnational orientation. It strives to establish an 
original and basic relationship between the people and public authority 
at national, subnational and supranational levels.61 It is not exclusive to 
a specifi c territory or legal order, but encompasses power-sharing among 
interrelated levels of public authority.62 Further, it is not based on the ex-
istence of a state: it is open to other political units.63 Second, even though 
Ingolf Pernice uses the notion of ‘levels’, this does not imply a hierarchy 
among the legal orders within a multilevel constitution.64 Both national 
and European legal orders have the same legitimacy originating in a di-
rect line from the citizens. Hence, there seems to be no place for a hierar-
chical relationship, but rather a coexistence of autonomous legal orders 
based on a functional division.65 Even though the terminology might be 
misleading, there is in fact only ‘functional primacy, based on mutual 
consideration, recognition, and cooperation between the courts’.66 On the 
other hand, this theoretical openness of the vision of multilevel constitu-
tionalism might also be viewed critically. One can go so far in embracing 
the close link between theory and the current pluralist reality within the 
EU as to accept this model as a well-functioning one. This then questions 
the constitutionalist appeal of providing order to the plurality of legal 
systems. If the citizens are the constituent, then how can it be legitimate 
for a confl ict of competences between legal orders to be worked out by 
way of judicial dialogue? This question acts as a bridge to the second 
critical remark about constitutionalism at the EU level. It is questionable 
whether there is enough democracy at the EU level to legitimise the con-
struction of an autonomous legal order originating in a direct line from 
the citizens without the intermediary of the national state usually used 
for the cases of international organisations.67 An answer to this possible 
60  Pernice (n 59).
61  Pernice (n 59) 365.
62  Pernice (n 59).
63  Pernice (n 59) 366.
64  Pernice (n 59) 383.
65  Pernice (n 59).
66  Pernice (n 59) 384.
67  For an overview of literature concerning the democratic defi cit of the EU, see Andreas 
Føllesdal, ‘Survey Article: The Legitimacy Defi cits of the European Union’ (2006) 14(4) Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy 441.
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criticism about the democratic defi cit of the EU can be easily imagined. 
The steps taken in the Treaty of Lisbon to improve the transparency and 
democratic legitimacy of the EU have to be noted.68 EU citizenship has its 
positive expression and is aimed at developing an EU identity in parallel 
to the national one.69 Second, there is the reorganisation of the Treaties, 
with the EU Treaty containing the common values, general objectives 
and principles, and the TFEU establishing the more detailed provisions 
on specifi c rights, competences and policies.70 Further, there are reforms 
contributing to this development, such as the introduction of the public 
session of the Council when acting in a legislative capacity, the new pow-
ers of the European Parliament, especially the co-decision procedure as 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ or the new responsibilities of national 
parliaments, especially the ‘early warning system’ foreseen in article 12 
TEU, and the citizens’ initiative.71 Still, these incremental changes have 
not provided a persuasive and credible answer to the question about the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU.72 There is also serious opposition to the 
idea of constructing a direct legitimacy connection between individuals 
and the EU under its current legal framework.73 Hence, acceptance of its 
existence might be premature.
This conclusion, however, does not preclude the potential of nation-
al constitutional identity as a concept from becoming a tool within the 
framework of European law to be used in the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure both by national constitutional courts and the ECJ.74 It could 
potentially become another mechanism in the structure of European 
constitutional pluralism. What such a pluralistic approach adds to the 
analysis is the inherent element of the ‘struggle’ between the judicial ac-
tors about the appropriation of this concept. 
The responsible Working Group of the European convention foresaw 
that ‘the Court could be the ultimate interpreter of the provision if the 
political institutions went beyond a reasonable margin of appreciation’.75 
This competence of the Court in Luxembourg appears problematic in 
68  For example arts 10, 11 and 12 TEU.
69  Pernice (n 59) 385.
70  Pernice (n 59) 388.
71  Pernice (n 59) 389-91; Nicolas Levrat, ‘L’initiative citoyenne européenne: une réponse au 
défi cit démocratique?’ (2011) 47 Cahiers droit européen 53, 99.
72  Levrat (n 71) 100.
73  For example Lissabon-Urteil (n 34), para 264. <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 9 June 2011.
74  Mayer (n 8) 784.
75 Final report of Working Group V of the European Convention (4 November 2002) 11 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00375-re01.en02.pdf > accessed 
1 April 2012.
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view of the limits of its jurisdiction. The scope of the Court’s competences 
does not include interpretation of the national law of the Member States. 
On this basis, one could build the argument that the Court would exceed 
its competences by judging what falls within the defi nition of German or 
Polish national constitutional identity. This is traditionally the realm of 
national constitutional courts. Hence, national constitutional identity is 
yet another concept in the long history of judicial dialogue between the 
ECJ and national constitutional courts. It appears questionable whether 
the growing importance of this concept refl ected in the Treaty amend-
ments implies any substantial changes to the way the Court in Luxem-
bourg deals with national particularities in the domain of human rights, 
the margin of appreciation of Member States and the reconciling of hu-
man rights confl icts. On the other hand, the concept might also be per-
ceived as a stronger argument in the hands of either the ECJ that could 
enlarge the scope of its jurisdiction in the domain of human rights, or 
of national constitutional courts to justify national derogation from the 
freedoms of the internal market. Currently, one could fi nd proof for both 
of the hypotheses, which indicates that there is no established approach 
towards the concept of national constitutional identity in the European 
framework. 
IV.1. The jurisprudence of the ECJ
When discussing the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice relat-
ing to national constitutional identity, it is impossible to limit the scope 
of analysis to cases dealing expressly with the concept. An approach 
that appears more revealing is rather one encompassing the judgments 
where the Court in Luxembourg dealt with a national constitutional par-
ticularity vis-à-vis European norms. Hence, it is rather the history of 
‘silent mentioning’ - constellations where the Court could potentially ap-
ply the concept of national constitutional identity. Such a potential also 
exists in the case Republic of Hungary v Slovak Republic, still pending at 
the ECJ.76 Advocate General Yves Bot in his opinion considered that EU 
law is not intended to govern the incident in question, where the Slovak 
authorities refused the Hungarian President entry into its territory.77 If 
the ECJ decides otherwise and applies EU law to the situation, national 
identity could be one of the factors weighed in the reasoning. In general, 
it remains questionable whether the fact of expressly relying on the con-
cept of national constitutional identity implies any substantial change in 
the jurisprudence of the Court.
76  Case C-364/10 Republic of Hungary v Slovak Republic (action brought on 8 July 2010).
77 , Republic of Hungary (n 76),Opinion of AG Bot, para 61.
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In Omega (2004), the Court used respect for human dignity enjoying 
a particular status as a factor falling within public policy that can justify 
derogation from the freedom to provide services.78 In the Michaniki (2008) 
case, on the other hand, the judges did not accept a constitutional pro-
vision as being ‘capable of reconciling the national provision at issue in 
the main proceedings with the principle of proportionality’.79 Would the 
result be any different now that the Court has at its disposal a written 
and binding catalogue of fundamental rights and the concept of national 
identity mentioned in Treaty? The European legislators chose to include 
the notion of national identities in the Treaties and to place it right next 
to the mention of equality of the Member States. Doubts remain about 
the impact of this choice on the European legal system. 
Nonetheless, the notion of national or constitutional identity has 
surfaced in European jurisprudence since the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty. In Sayn-Wittgenstein (2011), the Court accepted that: 
in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the abo-
lition of the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be taken 
into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate in-
terests and the right of free movement of persons recognized under 
European Union law.80 
The result is the same as in Omega (2004), although the superfi cial 
way of carrying out the proportionality test might suggest a certain per-
suasive power of national identity. 
An example of a case where the Court went a very long way in al-
lowing national identity as a justifi cation for derogation from EU law 
is the RuneviË-Vardyn (2011) judgment.81 The Court relies expressly on 
article 4(2) and affi rms that national language is capable of serving as 
an objective consideration justifying a restriction on freedom of move-
ment and residence of citizens of the Union. The Lithuanian government 
claimed that the ‘Lithuanian language constitutes a constitutional asset 
which preserves the nation’s identity (…) and ensures the expression of 
national sovereignty’.82
78  Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundestadt Bonn [2004] 
ECR I-09609.
79  Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis [2008] ECR I-09999, 
para 65.
80 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (22 December 
2010), para 83.
81  Case C-391/09 RuneviË-Vardyn (12 May 2011) not yet published.
82  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 81), para 84.
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The case concerned a Lithuanian national (fi rst applicant), member 
of the Polish minority and married to a Polish national (second appli-
cant). Lithuanian law foresees that in principle all entries on certifi cates 
of civil status must be made in Lithuanian. The rule has been confi rmed 
by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court as ensuring the constitutional 
status of the language.83 A possible exception to this rule is granted, 
though, for non-Lithuanian nationals.84 In consequence, the Lithuanian 
wife found herself with two birth certifi cates and two marriage certifi -
cates indicating her fi rst and family names respectively in Lithuanian 
and Polish versions (Malgožata RuneviË-Vardyn and Małgorzata Runie-
wicz-Wardyn). The husband had his name transcribed on the Lithua-
nian marriage certifi cate using characters of the Roman alphabet but 
without diacritical modifi cations (Lukasz Pawel Wardyn from the Polish 
Łukasz Paweł Wardyn). 
The judgment might be perceived as an example of the judicial re-
straint of the Court of Justice vis-à-vis national courts. First, the Court 
in Luxembourg emphasised that it is in principle up to the referring 
court to decide whether a preliminary ruling question is relevant for 
the case. In order to ensure the nature of the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure as ‘concrete judicial review’, the ECJ limits itself to ruling out 
obviously irrelevant questions.85 Moreover, the Court practically left the 
preliminary ruling questions open, leaving it to the national court to 
decide whether the change in names in the particular case amounted to 
a ‘serious inconvenience’, as well as to strike a fair balance between, on 
the one hand, the interest of the applicants to respect for their private 
and family life and, on the other hand, the legitimate protection by the 
Member State concerned of its offi cial national language and its tradi-
tions.86 Obviously, the Court recognised the sensitive nature of the re-
ferred questions in the context of the strong Polish minority in Lithuania 
and the Polish-Lithuanian relationship in general.87 On the one hand, 
this reserved judgment of the ECJ might be perceived as wise use of the 
framework of constitutional pluralism, allowing the Member States a 
margin of appreciation in order to ensure respect for their constitutional 
particularities.88 On the other hand, in practice the preliminary ruling 
procedure has often been used as a tool by ordinary courts to induce a 
83  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 81), para 27.
84  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 81), paras 10-14.
85  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 81), para 33.
86  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 81), paras 78 and 91.
87  See eg ‘Bad Blood: Polish-Lithuanian Ties Are Ancient But Increasingly Acrimonious’ 
The Economist (London 10 March 2012) <http://www.economist.com/node/21549987> 
accessed 09 April 2012.
88  Sarmiento (n 43) 290.
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change in the national jurisprudence. With this ‘silent judgment’, the 
Court in Luxembourg leaves the referring court little choice but to follow 
the previous jurisprudence of the national constitutional court. Hence, 
the ECJ seems to adopt a hands-off approach to the problem directly 
affecting individual rights of EU citizens. It might also be perceived as 
inconsistent with the previous jurisprudential line developed in the Gar-
cia Avello (2003) and Grunkin and Paul (2008) judgments, where the ECJ 
interpreted rather extensively the right linked to EU citizenship.89 A fl ag-
ship example of laconic jurisprudence endorsing the broad application of 
instruments of EU law, such as Union citizenship, is the Ruiz Zambrano 
(2011) case. The Court explained a highly controversial judgment in no 
more than 10 substantive paragraphs.90 
National identity as enshrined in article 4 (2) TEU is certainly a tool 
that can be used by various actors in different contexts. A recent judg-
ment of the ECJ shows that, apart from by the Courts, it has also been 
identifi ed as a useful concept by the parties to the proceedings. In the 
O’Brien case (2012), the Latvian Government, as an intervening party, 
argued that an application of European Union law to the judiciary would 
amount to a violation of article 4 (2) TEU.91 The ECJ did not accept this 
argument and applied the EU Directive to the case at hand.
The reality of the relationship between national and European con-
stitutional law can be described as constitutional pluralism: it is ‘het-
erarchical rather than hierarchical’.92 However, to the outside, the ECJ 
has been acting like a constitutional court, upholding the constitutional 
values of the EU, as in the Kadi judgment.93 The ECJ is defending the in-
tegrity of the EU legal order and human rights as the ‘very foundations of 
the Community’,94 by performing in fact a similar role to a constitutional 
court.95 Contrary to the GC, the ECJ is consistent in its ‘constitutional’ 
view of European law.96 It has considered the relationship between the 
UN Charter and the EC Treaty in the broader context of the relation be-
89  Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-353/06 
Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-07639.
90  Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi ce national de l’emploi (8 March 2011), paras 
36-45.
91  Case C-393/10 O’Brien v Ministry of Justice (1 March 2012), para 49.
92  Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2992) EUI Working Paper LAW No 
2002/1, 27 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/179/law02-1.pdf?sequence 
=1> accessed 7 July 2011.
93  Kadi (n 13).
94  Kadi (n 13), paras 282, 290, 304.
95  Nikos Lavranos, ‘Protecting European Law from International Law’ (2010) 15 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 273.
96  Lavranos (n 95).
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tween the international and European legal order, treating the UN Char-
ter as any other international treaty.97 But it has also clearly established 
its lack of power to review the compatibility of the SC resolutions with 
ius cogens.98 At the same time, it rejected the immunity from jurisdic-
tion of the Community acts implementing them. It views itself competent 
to ensure their compatibility with fundamental rights as enshrined in 
the European legal order. As Advocate General Maduro suggested, the 
relationship between international and European law ‘is governed by the 
Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that 
legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles 
of the Community’.99 This is pluralism at the global level. Simultane-
ously, the Court asserts the general principles of EU law as part of the 
European identity. The fundamental importance of human rights in the 
EU legal order has also been upheld with relation to the ECHR or in the 
context of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.100
As early as 1973, the Heads of the Member States proposed ‘pro-
gressively to undertake the defi nition of their identity in relation to other 
countries or groups of countries’.101 And this is how the Court is constru-
ing it right now. 
IV.2. The jurisprudence of national constitutional courts
National constitutional courts naturally have an ‘inside perspective’ 
of the EU. As they perceive themselves as guardians of national consti-
tutional identity, they are partners and essential elements of the con-
struction of European constitutional pluralism. Judges in this frame-
work should remain faithful to the narrative developed from that inter-
nal perspective, which can be national, domain-specifi c or European, 
but at the same time be informed of other legal orders existing in the 
‘outside world’.102 Hence the crucial aspect of pluralism as a theoreti-
97  Juan Santos Vara, ‘The Consequences of Kadi: Where the Divergence of Opinion between 
EU and International Lawyers Lies?’ (2011) 17(2) European Law Journal 262.
98  Kadi (n 13), para 287.
99  Kadi (n 13) Opinion of AG Maduro, para 21.
100  See Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris (24 January 2011) <http://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf> ac-
cessed 1 July 2011; Petr Kratochvil, ‘Discursive Constructions of the EU’s Identity in the 
Neighbourhood: An Equal Among Equals or the Power Centre?’ (2009) 9 European Political 
Economy Review 5.
101 Declaration on European Identity, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, 4 <http://www.
cvce.eu/obj/Declaration_on_European_Identity_Copenhagen_14_December_1973-en-
02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html> accessed 9 April 2012.
102  Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’ (Draft) 10 
<http://cosmopolis.wzb.eu/content/program/conkey_Maduro_Three-Claims-of-Plural-
ism.pdf> accessed 11 June 2011.
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cal approach, as defi ned by Maduro, promotes internal action informed 
by the external perception and knowledge of the system.103 However, in 
the most recent judgments, the Polish Constitutional Court - Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny (TK) - and the Czech Constitutional Court - Ústavní soud 
(ÚS) - use ‘identity talk’ rather to indicate a defensive approach to EU 
integration.104
For instance, the German Federal Constitutional Court - Bundes-
verfassungsgericht (BVerfG) - in its judgment concerning the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009) might even seem to take advantage of the new wording of 
article 4 (2) TEU in order to support its arguments. It expresses its view 
on the limits of European integration by claiming that:
the Basic Law does not permit the special bodies of the legislative, 
executive and judicial power to dispose of the essential elements of 
the constitution, ie of the constitutional identity (Article 23.1 sen-
tence 3, Article 79.3 GG). The constitutional identity is an inalienable 
element of the democratic self-determination of a people. To ensure 
the effectiveness of the right to vote and to preserve democratic self-
determination, it is necessary for the Federal Constitutional Court to 
watch, within the boundaries of its competences, over the Commu-
nity or Union authority’s not violating the constitutional identity by 
its acts and not evidently transgressing the competences conferred 
on it.
Even though the Lisbon judgment of the BVerfG includes a clear 
message about the problems and the limits of the process of European 
integration within its current framework, it is still formulated in a very 
cautious manner. One can observe a shift of expectations concerning 
democratic legitimation from the European to national level.105 While be-
forehand the emphasis was rather on the necessity to ensure democratic 
governance within the EU, in 2009 the Court in Karlsruhe seemed to 
put its hopes and expectations for a representative link to society in the 
hands of the national parliaments. 
The careful reasoning of the BVerfG opens up possibilities for vari-
ous viewpoints. It can be criticised from the perspective of a euro-enthu-
siast or defended in view of the traditional understanding of democracy: 
perceived as a constructive contribution to the structure of European 
constitutional pluralism or a merely defensive attempt to retain the con-
103  Miguel Poiares Maduro (Response to the question ‘What is Constitutional Pluralism’) in 
Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), ‘Four Vision of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2008) EUI 
Working Paper Law 2008/21, 14.
104  Mayer (n 8) 785.
105  Davor Jancic, ‘Caveats from Karlsruhe and Berlin: Whither Democracy after Lisbon?’ 
(2010) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 337ff.
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stitutional court ś position as the ultimate umpire in the power struggle 
with the ECJ.106 
IV.2.a. Trybunał Konstytucyjny on the constitutionality of an EU 
regulation 
The judgments of the Court in Karlsruhe seem to serve as a refer-
ence point for the other jurisdictions in Europe. Recently, extensive ref-
erences to the jurisprudence of the BVerfG concerning the supremacy 
of EU law have resurfaced in two recent controversial judgments of the 
constitutional courts in Poland and in the Czech Republic. 
In its judgment rendered on 11 November 2011, the Polish Constitu-
tional Tribunal - Trybunał Konstytucyjny (TK) - for the fi rst time ‘directly 
reviewed the conformity of the norms of EU secondary legislation to the 
(Polish) Constitution’.107 This question arose in the course of a constitu-
tional complaint to determine the conformity of article 41 of Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No 44/2011108 to article 45 (1) of the Constitution, article 45 
(1) in conjunction with article 78 and article 176 (1) of the Constitution, 
as well as to article 32 (1) in conjunction with article 45 (1) of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Poland.109 The complainant challenged the 
provision of the Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters on the 
basis that it amounts to an infringement of her right to a fair and public 
hearing in fi rst instance proceedings, the principle of equality in court 
proceedings and the principle of two stages of court proceedings as guar-
anteed by the Polish Constitution. The TK held that ‘the legal construct 
of ex parte proceedings is justifi ed by the special character, subject or 
function of given proceedings’.110 Hence, article 41 of the Regulation in 
question was viewed as consistent with the Polish Constitution. 
There are several surprising aspects in the judgment, the fi rst one 
being that even though the affi rmation of a lack of infringement of pro-
cedural rights of the complainant in the particular case did not require a 
great effort of argumentation, the TK took the opportunity to pronounce 
itself extensively in nearly 50 pages on the issue of the control of second-
ary EU legislation in light of the national constitutional norms. Several 
106 For different narratives that can be read into the Lisbon judgment of the BVerfG, see 
Mayer (n 8) 776.
107  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (16 November 2011) Ref No SK 45/09, para 8.1 <http://www.
trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/SK_45_09_EN.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012.
108  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2011 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2000] OJ L12/1.
109  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 5.1.
110  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 6.6.
495CYELP 8 [2012] 473-504
points in this judgment can be regarded as obiter dicta, allowing the TK 
to underline its ultimate authority. The TK also takes the opportunity 
to rely on article 4 (2) TEU. It regards respect of national constitutional 
identities as an obligation of the EU, representing a counterpart of the 
obligation of loyal cooperation of the Member States.111
From the perspective of the ECJ, it seems to be undisputed that 
the national courts do not hold ultimate competence to examine the EU 
legislation in view of its conformity with the Treaties or to adjudicate on 
the invalidity or interpretation of EU acts. These are namely the compe-
tences of the ECJ. However, in the view of the TK this does not exclude 
the possibility that the same acts can be examined in respect of their 
conformity with the national constitution by national constitutional 
courts.112 This competence of the national constitutional jurisdiction ap-
plies only for secondary EU legislation and not for the provisions of the 
Treaties. Nonetheless, it obviously creates possibilities for normative and 
jurisprudential confl icts.113 If the TK in Warsaw should fi nd a provision 
of an EU directive, regulation or decision contrary to the Polish consti-
tutional provisions, it would suspend its application in the territory of 
the Republic of Poland.114 With reference to its previous judgment on the 
Treaty of Accession, the TK recalls that there are three possible reac-
tions in such a situation, namely ‘amending the Constitution; or causing 
modifi cations within Community provisions; or, ultimately, on Poland’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’.115 Furthermore, a declaration of 
the unconstitutionality of an EU regulation could result in Poland’s li-
ability under article 258 TFEU.116 However, the TK sees itself bound to 
observe the principle of supremacy of the constitution in the Polish legal 
system, as this is the will of the constitutional legislator.117
Even though the bottom line of this judgment might be considered 
as a provocation from the perspective of European law, the tone of the 
TK’s argumentation is mostly conciliatory. A ruling declaring the non-
conformity of secondary EU law with the constitution is considered to 
be an ultima ratio, while an EU-conform interpretation of the national 
111  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 2.5.
112  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 2.3.
113  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 2.4.
114  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para.2.7.
115 Summary of the judgment of the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (11 May 2005) Ref No K 18/04, 
para 13 <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf> ac-
cessed 7 June 2012.
116 Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 107), para 5. 
117 Argument (n 116), para 2.4. 
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constitution shall prevail in practice.118 From the perspective of Polish 
constitutional law, the argumentation advanced by the TK with respect 
to differentiation between article 188 and article 79(1) of the Polish Con-
stitution and the inclusion of EU secondary legislation in the defi nition 
of ‘other normative acts’ in article 79(1) seems perfectly logical and le-
gitimate.119 However, it must be emphasised that this line of argument is 
being developed in the bubble of the purely Polish constitutional order. 
Beforehand, in a judgment in the domain of fi sheries, the TK ruled that it 
was not competent to review an EU regulation.120 The TK followed a well-
known approach that it can review merely the provisions of a transpos-
ing national act that are not dictated by the EU legal act. In the judgment 
of November 2011, the Court distinguished this jurisprudence on the 
basis that it was delivered in the course of proceedings of abstract norm 
control according to article 188 of the Polish Constitution and not on the 
basis of a constitutional complaint as in the present case. Hence, any 
more general statements on the inadmissibility of constitutional review 
of EU secondary legislation were expressed only obiter dicta.121 This line 
of reasoning actually undermines the signifi cance of general considera-
tions on the position of secondary EU legislation within the Polish legal 
order as these are also expressed obiter dicta in judgment SK 45/09. The 
Tribunal provides a concise lecture on the relation between Polish and 
European law as a dynamic system involving multiple law-making cen-
tres.122 It even goes so far as to present the principle of the supremacy 
of EU law that in the TK’s view does not apply to the Polish Constitution 
which ‘retains its superiority and primacy’.123 
The TK emphasises the parallels in the jurisprudence and the com-
mon values shared by the courts in Luxembourg and Warsaw in an at-
tempt to mitigate the negative effects of its substantially defensive, if 
not disrespectful, approach towards the European legal order. The Tri-
bunal emphasises its commitment to a relationship of cooperation with 
the ECJ.124 It foresees the ‘special character’ of the judicial review of the 
118  Argument (n 116), para 2.7.
119  Argument (n 116), para 1.2. 
120 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, 178/11/A/2009 (17 December 2009) Ref No U 6/08, para 
3 <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/OTK/teksty/otkpdf/2009/U_06p08.pdf> accessed 7 June 
2012.
121  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (16 November 2011) Ref No SK 45/09, para 1.2. <http://www.
trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/SK_45_09_EN.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012.
122  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 2. For more on the concept of ‘multicentrism’ 
in the Polish doctrine developed by Ewa Łętowska, see Ewa Łętowska, ‘Multicentryczność 
współczesnego systemu prawnego i jej konsekwencje’ (2005) 4 Państwo i Prawo 3. 
123  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 2.2.
124  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), paras 2.4 and 2.6.
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acts of EU law.125 Apparently, the TK will review their constitutionality, 
but cautiously with regard to the principle of loyal cooperation.126 Its 
review is supposed to be subsidiary in relation to the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ.127 This might suggest that in the case of non-conformity, the 
Constitutional Tribunal would fi rst refer a preliminary question to Lux-
embourg. Such conclusions remain, however, ambiguous as they are not 
applied in the case at hand. A general explanation of the stance of the 
Tribunal follows unexpectedly in the last part of the judgment, after the 
TK had rendered its judgment in the case presented to it.128 This clear 
statement of intent at the end lies clearly beyond the ratio decidendi of 
the case and appears even to be in contradiction to the approach applied 
to the present set of facts. For the future, the Trybunał Konstytucyjny in-
tends to apply the test of equivalent protection developed in the Solange 
judgments of the BVerfG and the Bosphorus judgment of the ECtHR. In 
order to ‘trigger’ the jurisprudence of the TK, a future complainant would 
thus have to ‘make probable that the challenged act of EU secondary leg-
islation causes considerable decline in the standard of protection of the 
rights and freedoms’ in the EU.129
Another aspect of this judgment that catches the eye is that the 
TK relies to a large extent on legal doctrine and on the foreign jurispru-
dence of the ECJ, the ECtHR and in particular, the BVerfG. This clearly 
reveals that the Tribunal delivers its judgment informed of the possi-
ble approaches adopted by other European jurisdictions. The constantly 
growing number of references among national constitutional courts can 
also be seen as a refl ection of constitutional pluralism. In judgment SK 
45/09, the extensive description of how the procedural rights at stake in 
the present case are protected under European law seems ambiguous as 
the Tribunal is apparently reviewing the compatibility of the Regulation 
exclusively with the Polish Constitution.130 On several occasions, the TK 
relies on the jurisprudence of the Court from Karlsruhe. On the one hand, 
the BVerfG had the chance to deal with the position of secondary EU law 
in the German legal order long before Poland even joined the EU. Hence, 
it might be regarded as only natural that the TK relies on the experi-
ence of its German counterpart. On the other hand, the Polish Tribunal 
defi nitely appears to strengthen its argument by referring to the BVerfG, 
which shows the important position the Court in Karlsruhe holds in the 
125  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 1.5
126  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 2.5.
127  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 2.6.
128  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 8.
129  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 8.5.
130  See Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 6.4.
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fi eld of judicial politics in the EU. Some of the parallels drawn by the TK 
to German jurisprudence might be criticised, in particular the reliance 
on the Honeywell judgment.131 In Honeywell, the BVerfG reserved com-
petence to review secondary EU legislation, although only if the legisla-
tion is manifestly ultra vires.132 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal goes 
further in its judgment, reviewing the conformity of the EU regulation 
with the human rights enshrined in the Polish Constitution. The Tribu-
nal also makes reference to the jurisprudence of the BVerfG concerning 
the supremacy of EU law (including the Solange judgments) as well as to 
the Bosphorus judgments of the ECtHR. The only logical conclusion is, 
however, that it does not apply them to the case at hand, as otherwise 
the TK would regard the standard of human rights protection within the 
EU as signifi cantly lower than under the Polish Constitution, which ap-
pears implausible. 
IV.2.b. Ústavní soud on the ultra vires jurisprudence of the ECJ 
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic - Ústavní soud (ÚS) 
- in the judgment announced on 31 January 2012 ruled that it would not 
apply a judgment of the ECJ in an analogous case because the Court in 
Luxembourg had exceeded the scope of powers transferred to the EU and 
hence had acted ultra vires.133 
The case concerned a Czech citizen, former employee of the Czecho-
slovak National Railways based in Bratislava, who claimed to be entitled 
to an old age pension that arose only taking into account the period of 
insurance acquired in the Slovak pension insurance system. The claim 
was dismissed fi rst by the Regional Court in Hradec Králové and then 
by the Supreme Administrative Court, before the claimant lodged a con-
stitutional complaint at the Constitutional Court.134 The legal question 
before the Court in Brno involved legal acts of European, international 
and Czech law. The fi rst two courts dealing with the case applied Regula-
tion (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application 
of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed per-
sons and to member of their families moving within the Community. The 
Regulation in Annex III point A/9 ensures the remaining applicability of 
131  Trybunał Konstytucyjny (n 121), para 2.6.
132  BVerfG, Honeywell, 2 BvR 2661/06, 6.7.2010, Absatz-Nr (1 - 116) <http://www.bverfg.
de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html> accessed 7 June 2012.
133  Ústavní soud, Pl ÚS 5/12 of 31 January 2012 (Slovak Pensions XVII - application of the 
Agreement between the CR and the SR on Social Security, obligations in international and 
EU law) 13 <http://www.usoud.cz/view/GetFile?id=6416> accessed 7 June 2012.
134  Decision of the Regional Court in Hradec Králové, of 29 January 2009 Ref No 52 Cad 
35/2008-40; Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 31 August 2011, File No 6 
Ads 52/2009.
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the Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on 
Social Security.135 With respect to that Agreement, the ÚS developed a 
rule which 
provides for the payment of a supplement to old age benefi t where 
the amount of such benefi t, awarded under (…) the Agreement, is 
lower than that which would have been received if the retirement 
pension had been calculated in accordance with the legal rules of 
the Czech Republic.136 
In principle, with the aim of avoiding ‘constitutionally impermissible 
discrimination’ resulting from ‘a particular circumstance that originates 
in the dissolution of the then-existing Czechoslovak federation’, the ÚS 
granted more benefi cial treatment than the one foreseen in the interna-
tional Agreement by counting the periods of employment in Slovakia in 
the same manner as those effectuated in the Czech Republic.137 This ben-
efi cial rule going beyond the Agreement applied, however, only to Czech 
citizens residing in the territory of the Czech Republic. The ÚS justifi ed 
that fact by reference to the scope of application of article 30 (1) of the 
Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms that guarantees 
the right to adequate material security in old age to Czech citizens.138 
Already in the Landtova case referred for a preliminary ruling by the 
Supreme Administrative Court, the ECJ ruled that the Regulation does 
not preclude the Czech Constitutional Court from increasing the amount 
of Czech old age benefi t, yet the requirements of nationality and residence 
that the ÚS attaches to its rule amount to direct and indirect discrimi-
nation.139 In order to justify its decision of sticking to the established ju-
risprudential rule, the ÚS engaged in a more general debate on the rela-
tionship between Czech and European legal orders. While recalling its 
previous judgments, the Constitutional Court reiterated the principles of 
a Euro-conform interpretation of national law and of the double bind-
ing subordination of transferred European law.140 The latter principle is 
consistent with the approach of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal as it 
implies a judicial review of secondary EU law for its conformity both with 
European and national law. The ÚS also underlined its role as ‘supreme 
interpreter of the constitutional regulations (…), which have the highest 
135  Published as no 228/1993 Coll.
136  Ústavní soud (n 133) 7.
137  Ústavní soud (n 133) 12.
138 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (as a part of the constitutional order 
of the Czech Republic) No 2/1993 Coll <http://www.concourt.cz/view/czech_charter> ac-
cessed 7 June 2012.
139  Case C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Ceská správa socialního zabezpeËeni (22 June 2011).
140  Ústavní soud (n 133) 9.
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legal force on Czech territory’.141 An interpretation contra legem of national 
provisions in order to ensure conformity with EU law would infringe the 
prerogative of the Constituent Assembly to amend the Constitution.142 The 
Court in Brno reserves the right to intervene and review the actions of EU 
organs in three situations: the non-functioning of EU bodies, protection 
of the material core of the Czech Constitution, and ultra vires control.143 
In the case at hand, the ÚS came to the conclusion that the ECJ had ex-
ceeded the powers that the Czech Republic had transferred to the EU. By 
applying the EU Regulation to the entitlements of citizens arising from 
social security until 31 December 1992, the ECJ had acted ultra vires.144 
The ÚS did not omit to voice a critique of the Court in Luxembourg for not 
familiarising itself ‘with arguments that respected the case law of the Con-
stitutional Court and the constitutional identity of the Czech Republic’.145
Another parallel between the judgment of the ÚS and the TK is ex-
tensive references to the jurisprudence of the BVerfG. Unfortunately, 
the Solange jurisprudence keeps being misunderstood as a gate-opener, 
granting national constitutional courts the possibility to ‘intervene in a 
matter that was addressed as part of the exercise of powers transferred to 
the European Union’.146 Such an interpretation disregards the fi rst step 
foreseen by the Court in Karlsruhe, namely the ‘equivalent protection 
test’ that was the necessary precondition to trigger the jurisprudence 
of the national constitutional court. The ÚS chose not to distinguish its 
previous jurisprudence given that it does not apply to pensions granted 
after accession to the EU, because now also the Regulation needs to be 
taken into account.147 Concerns about preserving the balance enshrined 
in the Agreement with respect to the repartition of the payment of pen-
sions between the successor states did not play a crucial role in the judg-
ment of the ÚS as it mostly involved an internal perspective.148
The ultra vires declaration is in the end a mere side effect of an in-
ternal confl ict between the Supreme Administrative Court and the Con-
stitutional Court in Brno.149 It is however important to observe that the 
141  Ústavní soud (n 133) 10.
142  Ústavní soud (n 133) 11.
143  Ústavní soud (n 133) 11.
144  Ústavní soud (n 133) 13.
145  Ústavní soud (n 133).
146  Ústavní soud (n 133) 3. See also 11.
147  This line of argument was suggested by the Czech Social Security Administration as a 
secondary party. Ústavní soud (n 133) 5. 
148  Ústavní soud (n 133) 5-6.
149  See Jan Komárek, ‘Playing With Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires 
Revolution’ (Verfassungsblog 22 February 2012) <http://verfassungsblog.de/playing-
matches-czech-constitutional-courts-ultra-vires-revolution/> accessed 7 June 2012. 
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ECJ has not shied away from involvement in relations among national 
instances. It should be enough to recall the Cartesio (2008) case, where 
the ECJ has as a result defended the full autonomy of a national court’s 
decision to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to Luxembourg.150 
This decision cannot be amended or set aside by an appellate court.151 
The underlying rationale is the protection of a preliminary discourse 
with the ECJ from appellate intrusions of superior domestic courts.152 
In such situations the implied consequence of the Court’s judgments is 
an ‘invitation to national judicial rebellion’.153 On the one hand, such a 
construction illustrates how the preliminary ruling procedure becomes 
an important tool of constitutional pluralism and contributes to the im-
provement of the quality of judgments. The national courts and the ECJ 
engage in a constructive discourse as each has to take into account that 
its judgment will be ultimately applied by another instance.154 On the 
other hand, a natural consequence is that instead of remaining a neu-
tral third party, the ECJ will be involved in power struggles between 
national institutions. The judgment of the Ústavní soud on Slovak pen-
sions can serve as an illustration of the risk of abuse of the structure 
of constitutional pluralism for judicial politics and of skirmishes among 
the national judicial instances.
V. Conclusions
The jurisprudence of the ECJ and the national constitutional courts 
referring to the national constitutional identities of the Members States 
fi ts into the framework of constitutional pluralism as a modus vivendi of 
the European legal order. One might perceive a more general tendency in 
the process of EU integration for EU policies to be increasingly dominated 
by national agendas.155 As a result, EU policies might be held hostage by 
the interests of the stronger Member States. These tendencies enhance 
the tensions inherent in the pluralist structure of the relationships be-
tween legal orders in the European arena. Constitutional identity is yet 
another concept used in this debate on ultimate authority. Pluralism 
assumes that the courts will compete over ultimate authority and will 
try to use such a concept ‘to their advantage’. With regard to article 4 (2) 
150  Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-09641, paras 88-98.
151  Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató (n 150).
152  Sarmiento (n 43) 300.
153  Sarmiento (n 43) 301.
154  Sarmiento (n 43) 302.
155  For the case of EU Enlargement Policy, see Christophe Hillion, ‘The Creeping Nation-
alisation of the EU Enlargement Policy’ (2010) 6 SIEPS 7 < http://www.wider-europe.org/
sites/default/fi les/attachments/events/SIEPS%20report.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012.
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TEU, the ECJ seems to have more persuasive power than the TK or the 
ÚS. However, the jurisprudence is certainly not settled yet.
The diffi culties in defi ning national or European constitutional iden-
tity stem to a large extent from the fact that it is merely a translation of 
a societal or cultural, if not metaphysical, concept into a legal context.156 
Identity supposedly represents an essence that distinguishes one consti-
tutional order from another: its ‘genetic patrimony’.157 
Asserting a European constitutional identity is a diffi cult task, in 
particular in view of the enlargements and the growing competences of 
the EU. The Court has been very careful with the concept of European 
identity; it has never used it expressly in its jurisprudence. However, 
when the Court affi rms the status of human rights as the ‘very foun-
dations of the Community legal order’, this sounds a lot like ‘identity 
talk’.158 Like other EU institutions, the ECJ has emphasised the com-
mon values of the EU to the outside rather than to the inside, namely in 
relation to the international legal order rather than to the legal orders 
of the Member States. Such an approach might be perceived as further-
ing the process of constitutionalisation inside the EU and strengthening 
the position of the ECJ as the EU’s constitutional court, but at the same 
time representing a pluralist stance outside the EU on the question of 
relations between legal orders in the international arena.
Respect of diversity both in internal as well as external matters is 
not a new value for the EU. Therefore, even though the normative refer-
ences to ‘European identity’ or ‘national identities of the Member States’ 
might be important declarations at a political level, they are not revolu-
tionary from the legal point of view. The concept of constitutional identity 
can become yet another tool in the European pluralist framework, used 
either to challenge or to uphold the authority of the ECJ. An interesting 
question in the legal architecture of the EU is whether national constitu-
tional identity becomes a concept of European law, enlarging the scope 
of competence of the ECJ, or whether it represents a useful tool ena-
bling national derogation from EU law. However, little consistent practice 
of the courts is available yet. A historical interpretation suggests that 
the legislative amendment of article 4 (2) TEU introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty was not intended as a derogation clause. It was suppose to grant 
156  Alexandre Viala, ‘Le concept d’identité constitutionnelle: approche theorique’ in Lau-
rence Burgorgue-Larsen (ed), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe (Edi-
tions Pedone 2011) 8.
157  Viala (n 156) 21.
158  Vasilios Skouris, ‘EuGH oder BVerfG - wer hat das letzte Wort?’ speech at the Deutscher 
Anwaltstag 2011 <http://www.davblog.de/?p=844> accessed 7 June 2012.
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competence neither to the EU nor to the Member States.159 On the one 
hand, the Court of Justice seems to have a tendency to gradually but 
constantly expand the fi eld of application of EU law.160 In light of this 
tendency, the usage of the principle of respect for the national identities 
of the Member States can also be seen as an attempt to ‘unionise’ this 
concept and guarantee the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court in Luxem-
bourg on the modalities of its application. Then the concept of ‘national 
identities’ would become just another instrument of EU law that would, 
however, not substantially change its melody.
In view of the inherent role of constitutional courts as guardians 
of the constitution, it is an extremely diffi cult task for them to strike 
a balance with the obligations arising under European law. One could 
expect that this inherent tension should become less visible and more 
settled with the advancement of the process of EU integration. However, 
the constitutionalisation of the EU legal order serves as a catalyst in this 
debate. Moreover, in the last decade, there seems to have been a general 
tendency in EU integration to adopt a defensive position, barricading 
the national constitutions, instead of defi ning the common values and 
principles.161 The Lisbon judgment of the Constitutional Court in Karl-
sruhe, especially when read in the context of the whole jurisprudence of 
the BVerfG concerning the relationship with EU law, can be understood 
more as a symptom than a problem, a symptom for unresolved issues of 
European integration.162 The BVerfG formulates hypothetical caveats for 
the ultima ratio case of normative incompatibility.163 
The ordinary judge can fi nd himself facing a clash of authorities 
when a judgment from Luxembourg does not correspond to the judgment 
of his national constitutional court.164 Nonetheless, unclear judgments of 
national constitutional courts disclosing a hostile attitude and a preva-
lent concern to protect their own jurisprudential turf do not offer a way 
to resolve this dilemma. The Polish and Czech constitutional jurisdic-
tions in their recent judgment failed to make a constructive contribution 
to fi nd a settlement of the relationship between national and European 
159  Final report of Working Group V of the European Convention (4 November 2002) 11 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00375-re01.en02.pdf > accessed 
7 June 2012.
160  Henri De Waele, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: 
A Contemporary and Normative Assessment’ (2010) 6(1) Hanse Law Review 3, 11.
161  Franz C. Mayer, ‘L’identité constitutionnelle dans la jurisprudence allemande’ in Lau-
rence Burgorgue-Larsen (ed), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe (Edi-
tions Pedone 2011) 84. 
162  Mayer (n 8) 785.
163  Jancic (n 105) 337. 
164  Sarmiento (n 43) 302.
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law. Those two judgments might be considered as examples of ‘bad’ con-
stitutional pluralism, highlighting the risks that such a non-hierarchical 
construction bears. 
Pure heterarchy, based on a balance of powers ignoring the insti-
tutional and normative framework of the EU in order to protect national 
constitutions and constitutional courts, comes with the inherent risk of 
leading us back to ‘a pre-war state of development in the international 
relations among the States of Europe’.165 On the other hand, even though 
one could identify cases where the judicial actors seem to miss an oppor-
tunity to improve the protection of individual rights (as the ECJ did in 
RuneviË-Vardyn (2011)) or where they show too much eagerness to ensure 
their own authority (as the Czech Constitutional Court did in January 
2012), this is how the system of constitutional pluralism functions. Eu-
ropean constitutional pluralism has the ambition of creating ‘a new kind 
of political polyphony intended to take the competing visions of Europe 
seriously’.166 Single criticisable judgments do not bring into question the 
viability of the whole framework, but it is important to be aware of the 
systemic risks.
165  Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ 
(2007) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2007/13, 23 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/6760/RSCAS_2007_13.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 7 June 2012.
166  Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘Germany as Europe: How the Constitutional Court Unwittingly Em-
braced EU demoi-cracy (A Comment on Franz Mayer)’ (2011) 9(3-4) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 786, 792.
